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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of monetary uncertainty on the inflationary bias and the variance of
output and inflation.  Monetary policy uncertainty is modeled as a shock to the central banker’s
preference for inflation stabilization relative to output stabilization that cannot be observed by the
public.  We find that the mean and variance of inflation increase with the variance of this preference
shock.  However, unlike other studies, we find that monetary uncertainty may very well have a
positive effect on output stabilization and therefore also on society’s welfare.
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1 Introduction
In writing about central bankers Milton Friedman once said: “From revealed preference, I suspect
that by far and away the two most important variables in their loss function are avoiding
accountability on the one hand and achieve public prestige on the other”.  More recently, Alan
Greenspan, ‘the delphic oracle of global financial markets’, speaking to Congress said: “If I’ve made
myself too clear, you must have misunderstood me.”
Hence, an important feature of central bank institutions is their adherence to secrecy.  The latter is
generally believed to be unjustifiable on moral grounds.  For instance, Mayer (1987, p.16) argues
that: “If governments derive their legitimacy from the consent of the governed, this should be
informed consent”.  And Goodfriend (1986) reports on an intriguing case study of how a graduate
law student, David R. Merrill, under the auspices of the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 filed a
freedom of information request with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System over its
failure to disclose its minutes.
This paper investigates society’s incentives to design monetary institutions that allow for central
bank secrecy.  We find that the main reason for central bank secrecy is its potentially beneficial effect
on stabilization policy.  Unlike Lewis (1991), this result does not require the social planner’s future
preferences for policy objectives to change over time with changing economic circumstances.
More specifically, optimal central bank secrecy involves trading-off the harmful effects of uncertainty
about monetary policy and the associated higher expected inflation, versus the potentially beneficial
effects on the stabilization of output.  The latter trade-off depends on the severity of society’s time-
consistency problem vis à vis its need for stabilization policy.  The analysis predicts that if the
credibility problem is large relative to the need for flexibility, optimal central bank institutions will be
very open and transparent and vice versa.  This reverses an earlier result by Garfinkel and Oh (1995).
Moreover it explains why high credibility such as the Bundesbank and the future European Central
Bank (ECB), can afford to be relatively closed, and why low credibility institutions such as the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Banco d’España need to be very open and need to publish e.g.
inflation and monetary policy reports of some kind, in addition to standard bank bulletins.
The paper is organized into three remaining sections followed by four appendices.  In section 2 we
present the model.  Section 3 contains the derivation of the relationship between central bank
secrecy, i.e. monetary policy uncertainty, and social welfare.  In section 4 we look at three different
cases of the effects of monetary policy uncertainty.  Our conclusions are given in section 5.  The
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appendices provide the derivations of the policy outcomes, a generalization of the model and the
optimal degree of central bank secrecy.
2 The Model
In what follows, we model monetary policy uncertainty as a monetary policy game with uncertainty
about the agent’s inflation stabilization preferences.  We assume that there are two types of actors,
wage-setters and the central bank. Wage-setters unilaterally choose the nominal wage every period,
and the central bank controls monetary policy.  The sequence of events is as follows.  In the first
stage, wage-setters sign one period nominal wage contracts [Gray(1976), Fischer (1977b)].  Wage-
setters know the domestic monetary regime on average but there are random shocks to central bank
preferences that cannot be observed at the time wage contracts are signed.  However, they know the
variance of the shocks and take this information into account in forming their expectations. In the
third stage stochastic shocks to productivity realize.  Similarly these shocks cannot be observed at
the time contracts are negotiated.  As will be shown below, the uncertainty associated with the
second and third stages of the game is, respectively, of the multiplicative [Brainard (1967)] kind and
the additive kind.  In the fourth stage, the central bank observes the value of the productivity shock
and, given its own preferences, reacts to the productivity shocks accordingly.  In the fifth and final
stage, output is determined by competitive firms.  This timing of events is summarized in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1:  The timing of events












2.1 Uncertainty about inflation stabilization preferences
Adopting the specification commonly used in the literature, output is described by a reduced-form
Lucas supply function:
y y b e= + − +* ( )π π ε (2.1)
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where y is (the log of) output, y*  is the natural rate of output;  inflation is denoted by π , nominal
wage contracts signed at time t-1 are proxied by the expected inflation rate π e , ε  is a white noise
shock to productivity with zero mean and variance σ ε
2  and b is the slope of the Phillips curve.  The
principal’s (society’s) loss function is given by
S y ky= + −α π 2 2( )* (2.2)
where α > 0 is society’s relative weight of inflation stabilization relative to output stabilization.  We
assume that k > 1 so that the desired level of output is above the natural level.
The agent’s (central bank’s) loss function is
L a y kyt= + −π
2 2( )* (2.3)
Note that in both loss functions the target rate of inflation is normalized to 0.  Equation (2.4)
specifies the stochastic behavior2 f the parameter at
a a xt t= − with Var[xt] = σx
2 and Et-1[xt] = 0 (2.4)
The wage setters expect the central bank’s preference for inflation stabilization to be a .  However,
at any particular point in time because of the shock xt , the central bank may be overly
“conservative” or advocate too loose a monetary stance (be too “liberal”).  We see the variance of
the agent’s inflation stabilization preferences (σx2) as monetary policy uncertainty.  In the limiting
case that σ x
2 0=  (and a at = ), we are back in the original Rogoff (1985) model.  Importantly, the
distribution of xt must be chosen in such a way that at  is always positive.  A negative preference
weight on inflation implies a central banker who actually loves inflation and therefore will set an
infinite rate of inflation.  If the wage setters know that there is a positive chance of having a central
banker who loves inflation, this probability, however small, will count heavily in the formation of
inflationary expectations.  Although there is no need to specify the distribution of xt, one could think
of it to be uniformly distributed on the [-c, c] interval with c < a .  A normal distribution clearly
doesn’t work here, because of its infinite support we can never exclude the chance that a large shock
occurs and at  becomes negative.
                                               
2  Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) introduce persistence and dynamize their problem by letting a et t= −α  where
e e xt t t= +−ρ 1  and 0< ρ < 1.  For analytical tractability we set ρ = 0.
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2.2 Time-Consistent Equilibrium
For simplicity, and with no loss of generality, we assume that the control variable of the central bank










where z=(k-1)y*.  Solving for rational expectations yields3





























< +( ) .  Note that for xt uniformly distributed on the interval [-c, c] ,c < a , this
condition is always satisfied.  The exact specification of F depends on the assumptions that one
makes.  Details can be found in Appendix B.
Solving for the same discretionary solution for expected inflation when there is no uncertainty
surrounding the central bank’s preferences emphasizes the importance of (2.6).  For this latter case,




                                               
3  See Appendix A for details on the derivations in this Section.
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Figure 2.2:  The function F
Equations (2.6) and (2.8) indicate that inflation expectations are proportional to the output bias, z , a
familiar conclusion in this literature.  However (2.6) differs in a significant way from (2.8), as a result
of the different information sets that the agents are assumed to possess.  Equation (2.6) reflects the
fact that agents have had to ‘guess’ about the effect of stochastic preferences on the inflation rate.
And assuming that the expectations of agents “are the predictions implied by the model itself,
contingent on the information economic agents are assumed to have” [Fischer (1977a)], expectations
are rational.  The real problem here, as we show in Appendix A, is that this involves taking
expectations in the presence of nonlinearities.
From (2.7), it is clear that, if the variance is not too large, F(.) > 0.  Moreover, as can be seen in
Figure 2.2, in the limiting case that σ x
2 0=  and therefore a at = , then F(.) =1, and (2.6) effectively
collapses to the discretionary case given by (2.8).
Using the previous results, it is straightforward to write the final solutions for output and inflation,



















And similarly for output, the solution is
y y bt
e
t= + − +
* ( )π π ε (2.10)
Figure 2.3 shows the central bank’s reaction to a preference shock x with the parameters  = 1, b =
1, z = 0.03 and the productivity shock ε = 0.  It is clear that with uncertain preferences, expected
inflation is higher than in the discretionary case without uncertainty.  In that case, the central bank
would set an inflation rate of 3%.  Note that this result does not depend on a particular distribution
of the disturbances to the agent’s preferences.  Hence our result is general and follows from Jensen’s
inequality4.  The same picture can be drawn for the central bank’s reaction to a given productivity
shock ε.
Figure 2.3: The central bank’s reaction to a preference shock x








realized inflation rate (π)
An important point arising from (2.9) is that although preference uncertainty exacerbates the existing
inflation bias problem, it cannot generate an inflation bias on its own.  This fairly intuitive point is
clearly a function of the multiplicative nature of the problem.
                                               





 be a convex function; then
E g a g at[ ( )] ( )≥ .
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3 The Welfare Loss and Monetary Policy Uncertainty
Using the policy outcomes that we derived in the previous section, we can now turn to the welfare
analysis.  Previous studies, in particular Nolan and Schaling (1996) and Lossani, Natale and Tirelli
(1996) have argued that uncertainty about the policymaker’s preferences leads unambiguously to a
social welfare loss.  We find, however, that this is not necessarily the case.  Monetary policy
uncertainty may improve output stabilization and as a result the welfare loss may well be lower.
In order to assess the effect of monetary policy uncertainty on welfare, we decompose society’s
expected loss in the inflationary bias, the variance of inflation, the output bias and the variance of
output.
E L E E y ky Var k y Var yt
e
t t{ } { } {( ) } ( { }) ( ) { }
* *2= + − = + + − +α π α π π2 2 2 1 (3.1)
Straightforward comparative statics demonstrate that rising uncertainty does increase the inflationary
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The interpretation of this expression, which is unambiguously positive, follows on from our remarks
above.  To the extent that increasing uncertainty threatens agents’ real wages, they will build in an
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as long as a a b b x
− −
+ − >( )2 2 2 2 0σ , which is exactly the condition we imposed on the variance of the
shocks to preferences in the context of equation (2.7).  Thus, the inflation penalty becomes steeper
the higher monetary policy uncertainty.
From equation (3.1) we derive the following proposition:
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PROPOSITION 1:  The greater monetary policy uncertainty (the higher σ x
2 ), the higher expected
inflation.
Proposition 1 shows that monetary policy uncertainty leads to higher inflationary expectations.



















The first part of this equation does not depend on monetary policy uncertainty.  In the second part,
apart from σ x
2  itself, also F depends on the degree of monetary policy uncertainty.  As F(.) is a positive
function of σ x








PROPOSITION 2:  The greater monetary policy uncertainty (the higher σ x
2 ), the higher the
variance of inflation.
This result is very intuitive.  Introducing a shock to the parameter that determines inflation
stabilization yields a more volatile rate of inflation.
To complete the welfare analysis, we now turn to the variance of output, which is the most
interesting part.  Output variance can easily be calculated from (2.10) and (3.5)
{ }Var y aa b
b
a b
bz b a F a b
x{ }
( ) ( )










2 2 2 21 2σ
σ
σε ε (3.6)
Again, the first term does not depend on monetary policy uncertainty, but on the variance of
productivity shocks σ ε
2 .  However, the second term depends on monetary policy uncertainty through
σ x
2  and F(.).  Interestingly, the second part of the equation can be negative if the variance of productivity
shocks σ ε
2  is very high and the principal’s output target z rather low.  This means that monetary policy
uncertainty can have a stabilizing effect on output.  The expression for the variance of output also shows
that the positive stabilizing effect of monetary policy uncertainty depends on the variance of output
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shocks.  If the variance of output shocks is large enough, uncertainty about the central bank’s inflation
stabilization preferences leads to a lower variance of output.  The reason for this counterintuitive effect
is that the monetary authority’s expected reaction to an output shock is stronger, the larger monetary
policy uncertainty.  So, in effect an increase in monetary policy uncertainty leads to less conservative
behavior of the central bank.
The overall effect on welfare is not easily determined.  Looking at equations (2.6), (3.5) and (3.6), it
is clear that the negative welfare effects of monetary policy uncertainty are increasing in the
principal’s ambitious output target z and independent from the variance of productivity shocks σ ε
2 .
For the positive output stabilization effect exactly the opposite holds.  So, if the ratio z/σ ε
2  is small (and,
therefore, the credibility problem small relative to the flexibility problem), society may benefit from
uncertainty about the policymaker’s preferences.
4 Optimal Monetary Uncertainty
As was explained in the previous section monetary policy uncertainty may be beneficial for society’s
welfare because the variance of output may be reduced.  This implies that the trade off between
credibility and flexibility is influenced by uncertainty concerning the agent’s preferences.  In this
Section we will determine the optimal level of monetary policy uncertainty in terms of social welfare.
Society’s expected loss is given by the following expression
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Figure 4.1: The optimal degree of monetary uncertainty
Π
Γ
Figure 4.1 shows the Π and Γ component of society’s loss.  The Π component, reflecting the
inflationary bias, is upward sloping, but the Γ component has a minimum at ~σ x
2  (see Appendix D).
As can be seen in the picture, ~σ x
2  is an upper bound for the optimal degree of monetary uncertainty
σ x
*2 .  As is shown in Appendix D, this upper bound shifts to the right if the credibility/flexibility ratio
z/σ ε
2  becomes smaller.
PROPOSITION 3:  The optimal degree of monetary uncertainty σ x
*2  has an upper bound ~σ x
2
(σ x
*2  ≤ ~σ x
2 ).  This upper bound goes up if the credibility/flexibility ratio z/σ ε
2
becomes smaller.
Table 1 illustrates the effect of monetary policy uncertainty σ x
2  on social loss S.  In this example we
have chosen b = 1 and α = 1.  This country has a rather high variance of productivity shocks and a
moderately ambitious output target.  Its credibility problem is small relative to its flexibility problem
(z/σ ε
2  is small) so we expect that monetary uncertainty might be beneficial.  In the first column we have
set σ x
2  = 0 and chosen the central banker’s expected inflation aversion equal to society’s (a  = α).  Then,
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in the second column, we minimize social loss S, using σ x
2  as the instrument, keeping all other
variables the same.  Finally, in the third column we use both a  and σ x
2  as instruments, using the
boundary condition that σ x
2  ≤ a2 /3.
Table 1:  The effect of monetary uncertainty on society’s loss
z 0.025 0.025 0.025
σ ε
2 0.005 0.005 0.005
σ x
2 0 0.28 1.09
a 1 1 1.81
E{π}% 2.50 2.88 1.70
Var{π}% 0.125 0.130 0.066
Var{y}% 0.125 0.095 0.161
S % 0.3125 0.3079 0.2567
We see that monetary uncertainty leads to a substantial decrease in the social loss.  The positive effect on
output stabilization is dominating the negative effects on the mean and variance of inflation.  If we use
both instruments to minimize the social loss (a  and σ x
2 , with boundary condition), an even larger welfare
gain can be reached.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the effects of monetary policy uncertainty on expected inflation and
the variance of inflation and output.  We find that uncertainty about the policymaker’s preferences
leads to a higher inflationary bias and a higher variance of inflation.  However, unlike previous
studies, we find that the effect on output stabilization may well be positive and the same is true for
overall social welfare.  This is due to the fact that the average response of the policymaker to an
output shock is stronger than in the absence of preference shocks.  In an example it was shown that
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the gains can be very substantial if the country’s flexibility problem is big relative to its credibility
problem.
Our results also imply that if the credibility problem can be solved or reduced by implementing a
Walsh contract or an inflation target, a country may still gain from appointing a conservative central
banker with uncertain preferences.
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Appendix A:  The Derivation Of Equation (2.6)
















This expression requires us to take the expected value of ratios of the inverse of a random variable.
This can be achieved through a Taylor series expansion.
Our problem is to expand φ( ) /z x y=  about the respective means.  Assuming that the first two
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So substituting (A.3) in (A.1) gives
π π




































2 2 2 2
(A.5)
which is expression (2.6) in the text.  It is clear that as σ x
2 0→  the first part of the expression on the
right hand side collapses to unity, and (A.5) is equivalent to (2.8).
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Appendix B:  The General Case
If we replace the central bank’s loss function (2.3) with a more general loss function, the expected
rate of inflation changes in the following way.
L a q y kyt t= + −π
2 2( )* (B.1)
a a xt t= − with Var[xt] = σx
2 and Et-1[xt] = 0
q q vt t= − with Var[vt] = σv
2, Et-1[vt] = 0 and Et-1[xtvt] = σxv
Using the derivations from Appendix A we obtain an expression for the inflationary expectations.
π e q a b q R











 with R q ab a qbx v xv≡ − − −σ σ σ
2 2 2 2( )
We choose q = 1 and σv2 = σxv = 0 so that R = σx2 > 0 and monetary policy uncertainty leads to
higher inflationary expectations.
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Appendix D: Optimal Central Bank Secrecy
1. The determination of ~σ x
2
As said before it is crucial to find out where Γ is minimized.  From the first-order condition at this
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 a solution for ~σ x
2  exists and is unique.  To
see this we use Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.  If the credibility-flexibility ratio is not too large
( )
G
a a b a a b z b
b z b
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Together with G being a monotonically decreasing function of σ x
2 we are now ready to prove
0 02≤ ≤~ ( )σ x G .
Proof: The lefthand side of equation (D.1) is a 45° line through the origin.  This line must intersect
the function G at one and only one point that is bounded between 0 and G(0).



































> .  This implies that if the credibility-flexibility ratio goes
down, the function G x( )σ
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